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RAILROADS - EXTENT OF TITLE ACQUIRED BY RAILROAD BY
ADVERSE PossESSION OF LAND UsED AS RIGHT-OF-WAY - EFFECT ON
MINERAL RIGHTS - In a recent Michigan case 1 it appeared that for
more than the statutory period of limitation the plaintiff railroad had
maintained a right-of-way over land to which the defendant held the
record title. A decree quieting title in fee simple absolute in the plaintiff railroad was sought in order to determine the ownership of the
1 Michigan Central R. R. v. Garfield Petroleum Corp., 292 Mich. 373, 290
N. W. 833 (1940).
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oil and gas underlying the right-of-way. The court held that the railroad acquired by adverse user of the right-of-way no title to the oil
and gas or other minerals beneath the surface of the land.
While it is generally true that a railroad corporation may acquire
an interest in land by adverse possession 2 as well as by grant or condemnation under a power of eminent domain, the extent of the interest
acquired will often vary according to the manner and the purpose of
the acquisition. Likewise, the use by the railroad of any particular piece
of land will be limited by certain rules stemming from the peculiar and
public nature of the railroad corporation. Usually, if the land was
acquired for right-of-way purposes, it can be used by the railroad only
for railroad purposes although the corporation may in some cases have
taken a fee simple title to the tract. 8 Even those courts which refuse so
to limit the use of right-of-way lands held in fee simple limit the use
of the right-of-way lands to uses which do not impair the operation of
the railroad nor endanger its public purposes.4 These rules will, it is
supposed, apply regardless of the manner of taking or the interest
acquired in the right-of-way, since they are based upon the peculiar
nature of the railroad corporation rather than the interest which that
corporation has in the land. Probably, too, only the second limitation is
2 I ELLIOTr, RAILROADS, 3d ed., § 462, 2 id., § u74 (1921); Felton v. Wedthoff, 185 Mich. 72, 151 N. W. 727 (1915); Munroe v. Pere Marquette R.R., 226
Mich. 158, 197 N. W. 566 (1924); American Bank-Note Co. v. New York Elevated
Ry., 129 N. Y. 252, 29 N. E. 302 (1891); Gulf C. & S. F. Ry. v. Brandenburg,
(Tex. Civ. App. 1914) 167 S. W. 170. However, in North Carolina and Pennsylvania
the fact that the railroad may enter under its power of eminent domain has led to the
conclusion that it cannot acquire title by adverse possession. Narron v. Wilmington &
W.R. R., 122 N. C. 856, 29 S. E. 356 (1898); Connellsville Gas Coal Co. v. Baltimore & 0. R. R., 216 Pa. 309, 65 A. 669 (1907).
8 The state can of course inquire by quo warranto into the railroad corporation's
power to act. See Attorney General v. Pere Marquette R. R., 263 Mich. 431, 248
N. W. 860 (1933) (railroad held not to be acting ultra vires in leasing right-of-way
land held in fee to preserve property from drainage of oil and gas), and Kynerd v.
Hulen, (C. C. A. 5th, 1925) 5 F. (2d) 160. There is, however, an intimation running
through the cases that the restriction is imposed directly upon the land regardless of
the manner of taking or the interest acquired. So, New York, C. & H. R. R. R. v.
Aldridge, 135 N. Y. 83, 32 N. E. 50 (1892) (land held in fee), and Norton v.
London & N. W. Ry., L. R. 9 Ch. Div. 623 (1878), affd. L. R. 13 Ch. Div. 268
( l 8 79) (land held in fee). In many cases where the restriction on use is stated it is,
nevertheless, true that only an easement was involved. E.g., Elyton Land Co. v. South
& North Alabama R.R., 95 Ala. 631, IO So. 270 (1891). See note 94 A. L. R. 522
at 524 (1935).
4 Certainly this is so if the state complains by quo warranto and probably even if
the question is raised in any manner. See cases cited supra, note 2, and Attorney
General v. Pere Marquette R. R., 263 Mich. 431, 248 N. W. 860 (1933) (quo
warranto); Northern Pac. Ry. v. North American Telegraph Co., (C. C. A. 8th, 1915)
230 F. 347 at 349·
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applicable to land not used for right-of-way purposes, and there the
only considerations in determining the permissible use will be the interest which the railroad has acquired in the land and the extent of its corporate powers.
Considering only right-of-way lands, then, if the land was acquired
by grant the first inquiry will be as to what estate was conveyed by the
grant. Conveyances for right-of-way purposes, even though in the
usual form to convey a fee, are often construed to grant only an easement; 5 and, regardless of whether the right to hold land in fee is given
to the railroad by its charter, it seems that the grant to the railroad will
be considered in the light of the purpose for which the land was acquired
and construed to give only that interest which is reasonably necessary
for the accomplishment of the purpose. 6 On the other hand, if the land
is acquired by condemnation under a power of eminent domain, the
extent of the interest taken depends upon the authority conferred by
statute. Generally eminent domain statutes are construed to give only
the power to take what is usually termed an easement 7 but which in
fact seems to be an interest sui generis, resembling an easement in many
particulars but also possessing some of the qualities of a fee, either
determinable or simple. 8
When title is acquired by adverse possession, h9wever, the fairly
definite indications of the extent of the title acquired which are found
in the charter or grant in the case of condemnation or purchase are
lacking. Instead there are only acts of possession by the railroad and
perhaps some evidence of its claim of title to which those acts can be
referred. Assuming that, as in Michigan,9 the railroad can acquire both
title in fee simple by grant and some interest by adverse possession, the
difficulty of interpreting the acts of the railroad as giving an easement
by prescription or a fee by adverse possession becomes apparent. The
5

E.g., Jones v. Van Bochove, 103 Mich. 98, 61 N. W. 342 (1894); Danielson

v. Woestemeyer, 131 Kan. 796, 293 P. 507 (1930); Kansas City Southern R. R. v.

Sandlin, 173 Mo. App. 384, 158 S. W. 857 (1913). See also Brightwell v. International-Great Northern R. R., 121 Tex. 338, 49 S. W. (2d) 437, 84 A. L. R. 265
at 271 (1933). In general, see 2 ELLIO'IT, RAILROADS, 3d ed.,§ 1153 (1921).
6 2 ELLio'IT, RAILROADS, 3d ed., § 1153 (1921); Abercrombie v. Simmons, 71
Kan. 538, 81 P. 208 (1905).
7 2 ELLIO'IT, RAILROADS, 3d ed., § 1222 (1921); for an extreme example, see
Chouteau v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 122 Mo. 375, 22 S. W. 458, 30 S. W. 299 (1894).
8 2 ELLIO'IT, RAILROADS, 3d ed., § 1222, pp. 759-760 (1921); and see Western
Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania R. R., 195 U. S. 540, 25 S. Ct. 133 (1904); Smith
v. Hall, 103 Iowa 95, 72 N. W. 427 (1897).
9 Felton v. Wedthoff, 185 Mich. 72, 151 N. W. 727 (1915), adverse possession;
Munroe v. Pere Marquette R.R., 226 Mich. 158, 197 N. W. 566 (1924), adverse possession; Quinn v. Pere Marquette R.R., 256 Mich. 143, 239 N. W. 376 (1931), title
in fee by grant.
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railroad's possession of its right-of-way will be exclusive whether it
holds a fee or only an easement,10 and it is probably true that ordinarily
the use which it makes of the right-of-way will be approximately the
same whether it holds the land in fee or not. On the face of the matter,
then, no definite conclusions as to whether the railroad takes a fee or an
easement can be drawn merely from the acts of user or possession.
Similarly it is difficult to draw any conclusions where there has been no
definite claim of title made other than by the acts of user and possession
themselves, for the acts themselves are equivocal and some portions of
the right-of-way in question are probably held in fee simple while
others are held only as an easement for railroad purposes. Likewise,
probably portions have been acquired by grant while others have been
acquired by condemnation. Consequently, no inference follows, as of
course, that the railroad's claim of title is either fee or easement.
The acts and claim of title being equivocal, the extent of the interest
acquired seems to depend principally upon the disposition of the courts
to regard the railroad corporations as a special type, whose holdings
in land are to be limited by the public nature and purposes of the cor-.
porations. That such a disposition exists is well .established. The rules
already referred to as limiting the use of right-of-way lands,11 the
tendency to construe grants to railroads to give only the interest necessary to the purpose for which they were purchased,12 and the strict
construction given statutes delegating the power of eminent domain to
railroads,13 all indicate unmistakably that particularly in regard to land
acquired and held for right-of-way purposes railroad corporations are
not treated in the same manner as ordinary private corporations or individuals. These rules are, of course, based upon the public functions,
duties and nature of railways. The same policy has generally led to the
decision that by use of land for a right-of-way the railroad acquires
only an easement for railroad purposes.14 Indeed, basically these same
10 l NICHOLS, EMINENT DoMAIN, 2d ed., 600-601 (1917). So, ejectment will lie.
Birmingham Sawmill Co. v. Southern R. R., 210 Ala. 126, 97 So. 78 (1923); Flint
& P. M. R.R. v. Detroit & B. C. R.R., 64 Mich. 350, 31 N. W. 281 (1887). In
most jurisdictions the railroad is entitled to exclusive possession as a matter of law, but
in some it is a question of fact as to whether it is necessary for the railroad. Kansas
Cent. Ry. v. Allen, 22 Kan. 203 (1879). See also annotation, 47 A. L. R. 549 at
552 (1927).
11 See cases cited supra, notes 3 and 4.
12 Supra, note 5, and annotation 84 A. L. R. 265 at 271 (i933).
18 2 ELLIOTT, RAILROADS, 3d ed., § 1222 (1921); l NICHOLS, EMINENT DoMAIN, 2d ed., § 192 (1917).
14 1 ELLIOTT, RAILROADS, 3d ed., §§ 462, 463 (1921); Pennsylvania R. R. v.
Breckenridge, 60 N. J. L. 583, 38 A. 740 (1898); Consumers' Gas Trust Co. v. Amer.can Plate Glass Co., 162 Ind. 393, 68 N. E. 1020 (1903); Hoffman v. Zollman,
-49 Ind. App. 664, 97 N. E. 1015 (1912); Brinker v. Union Pacific, D. & R. G. Ry.,
:II Colo. App. 166, 55 P. 207 (1898).
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considerations have impelled some courts to hold that a railroad may
acquire no interest in land by adverse possession and user thereof.15
Assuming, however, that some interest in land may be acquired by
adverse possession, a different result may possibly be expected where
the adverse possession is under color of title in fee simple, or where the
acts of user of the right-of-way are more extensive than would be consistent with a claim to an easement alone.16
The majority opinion in the principal case seems to intimate that.
the railroad cannot acquire a greater interest than is necessary for its
operations by adverse user of a right-of-way. Taken in its full implications, this involves, of course, considerably more emphasis on the nature
of the railroad corporation and the policy of limiting its interest in
land than does the concurring opinion of Butzel, J. The latter preferred to hold merely that the railroad takes ·only an easement where its
adverse possession has been confined to use of the land as a right-ofway, leaving open the question whether the railroad can take a greater
interest where the acts of possession or the color or claim of title were
inconsistent with other-than a fee ownership of the land. The dissenting
justices, on the other hand, saw no reason to apply a different rule or
interpretation to the exclusive possession of the railroad than would be
applied to exclusive possession by an individual. It seems to the writer
that no particular injustice is done by allowing the railroad to take
only an easement, and that the fact that only an easement for right-ofway purposes is ordinarily required for proper operation of the railroad
tends to justify requiring the railroad claiming by adverse possession
to show more than acts consistent with ownership of an easement before
it can be held to have taken a fee by limitation. However, the writer is
inclined to agree with the implication of the concurring justice that the
case might well be different if there were acts of possession inconsistent
with an easement for railroad purposes alone, or if there were color of
title in fee or perhaps even express claim of title in fee.
Of course, if it be concluded that the railroad has acquired only an
easement by prescription, either because its user and claim of title are
no greater or because it is not allowed to acquire by adverse user a
greater interest in land than its public purposes justify, it follows from
15 Narron v. Wilmington & W. R. R., 122 N. C. 856, 29 S. E. 356 (1898);
Connellsville Gas Coal Co. v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 216 Pa. 309, 65 A. 669 (1907).
16 See language so intimating in Brinker v. Union Pacific, D. & R. G. Ry., I I
Colo. App. 166, 55 P. 207 (1898); and in Covert v. Pittsburgh & W. R. R., 204
Pa. 341, 54 A. I 70 (1903), a railroad taking as purchaser from one holding by adverse
possession under a deed giving color of title was permitted to tack its possession and
its grantor's possession to make up the period of limitation. Note that this was allowed
even though in Pennsylvania a railroad cannot usually acquire land by adverse possession. Connellsville Gas Coal Co. v. Baltimore & 0. R. R., 216 Pa. 309, 65 A. 669
(1907).
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the very nature of an easement that no rights are acquired to the
minerals beneath the surface of the land.11 It is to be remembered,
however, that the owner of the fee will not be allowed to enter in
order to drill for oil and gas or to conduct any subsurface operations
that might impair the operation of the railroad,18 and also, that even if
the railroad might in a proper case take the fee to the land, its user
will be limited by the rules referred to above, which are consequences
of the public nature of the railroad. From this same public nature comes
the policy which impels the holding of the principal case that an easement for right-of-way purposes alone can be taken by adverse possession. The essential soundness of the policy seems fairly established, but
that it should override the usual rules of adverse possession where
the railroad holds under a claim or color of title in fee simple, or where
the user is more extensive than would be consistent with an easement
in the railroad, seems open to serious doubt.
Roy L. Rqgers

11 Southern Pacific R. R. v. San Francisco Savings Union, 146 Cal. 290, 79 P.
961 (1905); Consumers' Gas Trust Co. v. American Plate Glass Co., 162 Ind. 393,
68 N'. E. 1020 (1903); Right of Way Oil Co. v. Gladys City Oil, Gas & Mfg. Co.,
106 Tex. 94, 157 S. W. 737 (1913); Uhl v. Ohio River R. R., 51 W. Va. 106, 41
S. E. 340 (1902).
18 2 SUMMERS, OIL AND GAs, perm. ed.,§ 220 (1938); Midland Valley R.R. v.
Sutter, (C. C. A. 8th, 1928) 28 F. (2d) 163.

